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Voir Dire: How Should It Be Conducted
To Ensure That Our Juries Are
Representative and Impartial?*
By JON VAN DYKE**
During the questioning of prospective jurors for the 1971 murder
trial of Black Panthers Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins in New Haven,
defense attorney Catherine Roraback frequently stood directly behind
her client while asking questions to make the juror look at Ericka
Huggins and recognize that the white attorney had a friendly and
respectful attitude toward her black client. After one juror had said
repeatedly that she could be fair, Ms. Roraback moved behind her client
and asked, "Is there anything about your attitude or experiences we
haven't covered in all of these questions that would make you unable to
listen to the evidence in this case and reach an unbiased verdict?"
The prospective juror looked directly at the defendant for the first
time and burst out, "She's guilty!"
A startled Judge Harold M. Mulvey asked, "What did you say?"
and the woman in the jury box again said, "She's guilty." Judge
Mulvey promptly excused her for cause.1
Such outbursts and the prejudice that lies behind them are less rare
than one might think, and many trial lawyers argue vociferously that it
is during this pretrial selection of jurors, the voir dire, that cases are won
or lost. The term voir dire is of ancient origin and is variously translat-
ed as "to speak the truth," or "to see what he or she says." Whatever
* The material for this article is derived from research undertaken by Jon Van
Dyke for the Twentieth Century Fund. The article is adapted from a chapter of Pro-
fessor Van Dyke's book on jury selection that is currently being edited and prepared for
publication in late 1976. The book is tentatively entitled, OUR UNCERTAIN COM-
MITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE JURIES [hereinafter cited as OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT].
** Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Ginger, What Can Be Done to Minimize Racism in Jury Trials?, 20 J. PuB.
L. 427, 437-38 (1971).
HASTINGS CONSITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the literal translation of the term, it is now widely used, and the conduct
of voir dire is now widely controversial. Should the judge alone ques-
tion the jurors to uncover possible bias because the judge is best suited
to carry on the inquiry impartially? Or should the competing attorneys
question the jurors direotly because only they know all the issues that
will be raised during the course of the trial and only they will probe the
inner psyches of the jurors? Should the prospective jurors be ques-
tioned individually or collectively? What kinds of questions can be
asked? What is the purpose of questioning the jurors at all?
After the 1972 Angela Davis murder trial, Mary Timothy, who
had been jury forewoman, said she felt attorney-conducted voir dire was
instrumental in securing an impartial jury:
Let me illustrate. There had been a large sum of money au-
thorized by the Presbyterian Church to be used for the defense of
Angela Davis. This situation was peculiar to this case, and it was
of vital importance that prospective jurors who belonged to this re-
ligious organization be queried about their reaction to the Church's
decision to give this money to the defense.
In another instance, a prospective juror who stated repeatedly
that he would be able to give Ms. Davis a fair trial despite the fact
that she was an avowed communist, through very adroit question-
ing, finally admitted that he might very well not be able to accept
the testimony of other communists who might appear as witnesses
for the defense. 2
Even with the extensive questioning in that case, all prejudices were not
uncovered, and a number of the jurors were unable to accept the
veracity of the attorneys who testified. Mary Timothy said after the
trial that some of the jurors had stereotyped lawyers "as artful, menda-
cious, deceitful and untrustworthy, ' 3 and were unable to give any
credence to their accounts of the events. Fortunately, the testimony of
the various attorneys was not central to the case of either the prosecution
or the defense.
Jurors can be challenged either for cause, "on a narrowly specified,
provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality," or peremptorily,
according to the whim or strategy of the competing litigants and their
lawyers. An unlimited number of jurors can be challenged for cause,
but the trial judge must agree that the juror is prejudiced in some way.
Each side is given a finite number of peremptory challenges which they
can exercise without judicial approval. The bias necessary to justify
2. Affidavit prepared by Mary Timothy, submitted in the case of United States
v. McNeil, CR No. 73-0098 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 1973) (emphasis in original).
3. id.
4. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
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challenging a juror for cause includes, for instance, being related to a
litigant or having some special interest in the controversy. It may also
include racial prejudice against a litigant-one of the debates that we
will examine shortly. The preliminary question is, however, whether it
is possible to discover all the prejudices that jurors bring into court
through voir dire, and whether the effort to uncover all of those preju-
dices is worth the costs---costs not only in terms of time and expense but
also in terms of intimating that some people are going to be "better" and
"more impartial" jurors than others. I have concluded that if the list
from which jurors are selected is a complete or nearly complete census
of the community and if excuses are granted only in exceptional circum-
stances, then justice would be better served if juries were composed of
the first twelve persons randomly selected from that list, and that the
questioning and challenging of jurors should be limited to actual blood
or friendship ties between jurors and litigants. Until such truly repre-
sentative lists become standard, however, a careful questioning of jurors
and exercise of challenges is necessary to counter partially the biases
present in the selection process. 5
A Brief History of the Voir Dire
During the early days of the Anglo-Saxon jury, litigants had no
right to question prospective jurors about their prejudices. In fact, at
least some of the jurors were expected to be familiar with the dispute
and, because they were selected from the propertied class, they were
expected to favor the Crown in criminal cases. 6 Jurors could be chal-
lenged for specific bias, such as blood, marriage or economic relation-
ship to a litigant; but a nonspecific bias, such as ill-feeling toward a
litigant's class, race or religion, could not be the basis for a challenge for
cause, and no questioning on such matters was allowed.
When a prospective juror was charged with specific bias during this
early period, the party making the challenge had to do so before any
questions were asked of the juror. Then, once the challenge was made,
the justice appointed two impartial "triers" who might be coroners,
attorneys or unchallenged members of the jury, and these triers would
make a decision based on evidence offered by the challenging party and
any rebuttal evidence presented.7
5. The underrepresentation of nonwhites, the young, women and the poor that re-
sults from the use of such standard lists as the registered voters list is discussed and doc-
umented at length in OUR UNCERTAiN COMMITMENT, supra note *.
6. See, e.g., Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitu-
tional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L REV. 290, 292 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gutman].
7. J. PROFFATr, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 247 (1877); HL RosCOE, CaIub-
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This practice continued until the time of the American Revolution,
when, because of the controversial trials that became a focal point for
political disputes, the revolutionaries demanded the right to question
jurors about their prejudices. Patrick Henry argued that he would
prefer to be tried by a judge alone than by a jury selected without the
right to question and challenge.8 The Select Committee of the House of
Representatives that was empowered to draft the Bill of Rights specifi-
cally mentioned "the right of challenge" in its first draft of what became
the Sixth Amendment, but this language was later excluded because the
words "an impartial jury" in the Sixth Amendment, when considered in
conjunction with the Ninth Amendment's reservation of unmentioned
rights to the states and the people, had the effect of securing the right to
question and challenge jurors.' About twenty years later, during the
treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807, Chief Justice John Marshall
(sitting as a trial judge) had occasion to confirm this history and to
assert firmly and eloquently that prospective jurors should be examined
at length in order to root out prejudices. 10
Burr had been vice-president under Thomas Jefferson from 1801
to 1805, but the two men were political enemies throughout this period.
The enmity grew when Burr killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel in
1804. Shortly thereafter, Burr apparently assembled a small army in
Kentucky, and Jefferson brought treason charges against him. The
media of the day described the feud between Jefferson and Burr in
detail, the citizenry chose sides, and the difficulties in selecting an
impartial jury increased. John Marshall was no friend of Jefferson,
and he made a number of rulings during the trial that have stood the test
of time but may initially have been made, at least in part, for partisan
reasons.
The government attorneys argued that jurors should not be dis-
qualified simply because they have some preconceived notions about the
dispute, but Marshall ruled that such prejudice was ground for a chal-
lenge for cause and that jurors should be questioned to determine their
feelings on the evidence. Marshall analogized the situation to that of a
hypothetical juror who was distantly related to a litigant:
The relationship may be remote; the person may never have seen
the party; he may declare that he feels no prejudice in the case;
and yet the law cautiously incapacitates him from serving on the
NAL EVIDENCE 281 (15th ed. 1928); Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: L The
English Practice, 16 GEo. LJ. 438, 443 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
8. Gutman, supra note 6, at 296-97.
9. Id. at 297-99.
10. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (No. 14,692(g)) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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jury because it suspects prejudice, because in general persons in a
similar situation would feel prejudice."1
Similarly, persons with some preconceived notion about the facts or the
litigants must be disqualified. A person who has some preliminary
ideas about the matter, just like a person who has some relationship with
a litigant, cannot be an impartial judge:
He will listen with more favor to that testimony which confirms,
than to that which would change his opinion; it is not to be ex-
pected that he will weigh evidence or argument as fairly as a man
whose judgment is not made up in the case.12
This decision was enormously influential. Virtually all the state courts
fell into line and authorized the questioning of jurors in areas of non-
specific bias,'" a sharp departure from the practice in England and Can-
ada, countries that to this day do not permit such questioning.14
Does the Voir Dire Really Produce
an Impartial Jury?
The American voir dire was thus expanded to cover areas of
nonspecific bias to ensure that only jurors who would be able to adjudi-
cate objectively would be impaneled. But is this really the likely result?
Or does the process of questioning and challenging jurors lead instead to
a jury that is less representative of the community than would be the
first twelve persons on a randomly selected list?
In the spring of 1973, the weekly Texas Observer obtained a copy
of a book prepared in the Dallas County district attorney's office that
spelled out in astonishingly frank terms the kinds of jurors that prosecu-
tors try to impanel. This book, entitled Prosecution Course, was assem-
bled to help train prosecuting attorneys in Texas. The chapter on "Jury
Selection in a Criminal Case" was written by an assistant district attor-
ney in Dallas named Jon Sparling, who had become locally famous for
persuading a jury to impose a 1,000-year sentence on a convicted felon.
Excerpts from his chapter are reprinted at length here because they
provide a rare, candid glimpse into the prosecutorial mentality:
11. Id. at 50.
12. Id.
13. Gutman, supra note 6, at 307-08 n.54.
14. P. DEvLUN, TRAL BY JURY 27-37 (1956); Maxwell, The Case of the Rebellious
Juror, 56 A.B.A.J. 838, 840 (1970), citing R. MILL A, CVIL PRocrDURE OF THE TRIAL
CouRT IN HISTORICAL PERSPEcTIvE 289-92 (1952); Moore, supra note 7, at 453; Note,
Judge Conducted Voir Dire as a Time-Saving Trial Technique, 2 RuTGERS-CmDEN L.
161 (1970).
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Who you select for the jury is, at best, a calculated risk. Instincts
about veniremen may be developed by experience, but even the
young prosecutor may improve the odds by the use of certain
guidelines-if you know what to look for ...
III. What to look for in a juror.
A. Attitudes.
1. You are not looking for a fair juror, but rather a
strong, biased and sometimes hypocritical individual who be-
lieves that Defendants are different from them in kind, rather
than degree.
2. You are not looking for any member of a minority
group which may subject him to oppression-they almost
always empathize with the accused.
3. You are not looking for the free thinkers and flower
children.
B. Observation is worthwhile.
1. Look at the panel out in the hall before they are
seated. You can often spot the showoffs and the liberals
by how and to whom they are talking.
2. Observe the veniremen as they walk into the court-
room.
a. You can tell almost as much about a man by how
he walks, as how he talks.
b. Look for physical afflictions. These people usu-
ally sympathize with the accused.
3. Dress.
a. Conservatively, well dressed people are generally
stable and good for the State.
b. In many counties, the jury summons states that
the appropriate dress is coat and tie. One who does not wear
a coat and tie is often a non-conformist and therefore a bad
State's juror.
4. Women.
a. I don't like women jurors because I can't trust
them.
b. They do, however, make the best jurors in cases
involving crimes against children.
c. It is possible that their "women's intuition" can
help you if you can't win your case with the facts.
d. Young women too often sympathize with the de-
fendant; old women wearing too much make-up are usually
unstable, and therefore are bad State's jurors.15
An assistant district attorney in Albuquerque, New Mexico, told
me that he considered voir dire to be necessary to remove the "nuts"
15. The Texas Observer, May 11, 1973, at 9 (emphasis added). See Time Maga-
zine, June 4, 1973, at 67.
from the jury, who might force the jury to "hang' by holding out for
acquittal in the face of eleven other jurors who might want to convict.
"We have to question them," he said, "to get the flaky wierdos off the
jury.' '6
Defense attorneys are, of course, seeking jurors with apparent
biases in the opposite direction. Depending on the nature of the case,
they will look for the young, the better educated, the nonwhite, the odd
or whatever. Lawyers who regularly try personal injury cases have their
own stereotypes of who should be picked as jurors and who should be
avoided. 17 One attorney who represents plaintiffs says that he tries to
impanel older jurors, persons who are in low-income categories, persons
who are the same sex as the plaintiff, and in general people who like
other people."8 Another San Francisco plaintiff's attorney says that he
usually challenges retired military officers, accountants, engineers and
postal employees, because these persons tend not to give high verdicts. 9
All of these generalizations are, of course, based on stereotypes and
deny the uniqueness of each person. The exercise of challenges by
opposing attorneys tend to cancel each other. The process of question-
ing and challenging prospective jurors then becomes a battle of wits that
produces not the most impartial jury, but rather a group of the least
interesting persons in the courthouse.
Does a Conflict Exist Between
Representativeness and Impartiality?
Would a jury impaneled without any questioning and challenging
for nonspecific bias now be unconstitutional? Such a jury, if randomly
selected from a complete census of the community, would certainly be
more representative and would be more likely to be a "cross-section of
the community." Would it be impartial? Does a conflict exist between
the demand for impartiality and the desire for representativeness? Or is
a representative jury necessarily more impartial because it includes
diverse elements of the community, including many persons who would
almost inevitably be challenged in any trial? Is "impartiality" a value-
free concept implying attainable objectivity, or does it simply mean a
balance between the diverse views and experiences in our society? Is a
16. Interview with Joseph A. Jelso, Assistant District Attorney of Albuquerque,
New Mexico, June 3, 1974.
17. See, e.g., Kallen, Peremptory Challenges Based Upon Juror Background-A
Rational Use?, 13 TRIAL LAwyErS's GumE 143 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kallen].
18. Interview with Joseph Cotchett, San Francisco attorney, Aug. 21, 1972.
19. Interview with E. Robert Wallach, San Francisco attorney, Aug. 4, 1972.
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body containing only the middle-of-the-road members of the community
likely to be more "impartial" than a body also containing persons to the
left and right of center?
Justice Byron White said in Swain v. Alabamda that "[t]he func-
tion of the [peremptory] challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of
partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before
whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed
before them, and not otherwise."' Are the people unobjectionable to
either side really more likely to weigh the evidence more impartially
than the apparently strong-minded persons who are challenged by one
side or the other?
Professor Dale W. Broeder studied this question as part of the
massive Ford Foundation-funded Chicago Jury Project of the 1950's
and 1960's and discovered that the voir dire and the challenging process
that followed were ineffective in achieving the results desired by the
competing attorneys:
The message here is exceedingly clear: Voir dire was grossly
ineffective not only in weeding out "unfavorable" jurors but even
in eliciting the data which would have shown particular jurors as
very likely to prove "unfavorable. '22
Professor Broeder studied twenty-three civil jury trials held in a midwest
federal court in the late 1950's, and he questioned the lawyers and
jurors after each case. He found a remarkable number of people with
explicit prejudices who were nonetheless permitted to sit on juries and
found that most lawyers did not take the voir dire very seriously. Some
of these observations are not typical, because the study was made when
federal jurors were specially selected according to the "key-man" system
and hence were predominately upper-middle-class and also because the
judge involved did not approve of a protracted questioning period. But
two of Professor Broeder's observations are important: (1) in most
cases the personalities of the jurors were simply too complex to enable
the attorneys to pick and choose their jurors carefully (the jurors were
influenced in unexpected ways during th6 trial);23 and (2) the prospec-
tive jurors often withheld the truth when being questioned.24  If they
wanted to serve as jurors they responded so that they would be accepta-
20. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
21. Id. at 219.
22. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. RBV.
503, 505 (1965).
23. Id. at 515-21.
24. Id. at 510-15.
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ble to the two attorneys, and if they did not want to serve they gave
answers that would lead to a challenge.
Professor Broeder's study raises serious questions about the value
of the voir dire, especially when it is demonstrated that the process of
questioning and challenging produces a jury that is less representative
than a jury selected randomly from a complete census would be. It is,
for instance, not uncommon even today for the prosecution to exercise
its peremptory challenges to eliminate all or almost all the jurors of the
defendant's ethnic background.2 5 Personal injury attorneys freely ad-
mit that they consider seriously the juror's ethnic and occupational
background when deciding whether to challenge.2 6 And recently, in
important political cases, defense teams and the F.B.I. have carefully
checked into each prospective juror's background by questioning neigh-
bors and employers in order to exercise challenges with the greatest
effect. The result, if the original list of jurors were representative,
25. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 518 F.2d 534, 535 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137
(1974); United States v. Carlton, 456 F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Corbitt, 368 F. Supp.
881, 886-88 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Brown v. State, 248 Ark., 561, 566-67, 453 S.W.2d 50,
53-54 (1970); In re Wells, 20 Cal. App. 3d 640, 647-48, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5 (1971);
People v. Boyd, 16 Cal. App. 3d 901, 905, 94 Cal. Rptr. 575, 577 (1971); Allen v. State,
231 Ga. 17, 19, 200 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1159 (1974); Hobbs
v. State, 229 Ga. 556, 560, 192 S.E.2d 903, 907 (1972); State v. Arceneaux, 302 So.
2d 1, 4 (La. 1974); State v. Jack, 263 La. 75, 285 So. 2d 204, 207 (1973); State v.
Smith, 263 La. 75, 78, 267 So. 2d 200, 201 (1972); State v. Lee, 261 La. 310, 312,
259 So. 2d 334, 335 (1972); State v. Amphy, 259 La. 161, 171-72, 249 So. 2d 560,
564 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972); State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 1119-
21, 249 So. 2d 143, 152-53 (1971); State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 827-29, 244 So. 2d
200, 230 (1971), penalty vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 938 (1972); Johnson v. State,
9 Md. App. 143, 148-51, 262 A.2d 792, 796-97 (1970); Commonwealth v. Cook, 308
N.E.2d 508, 510 (Mass. 1974); People v. Redwine, 50 Mich. App. 593, 595-96, 213
N.W.2d 841, 842-43 (1973); State v. Brookins, 469 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Mo. 1971); Clark
v. State, 465 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Mo. 1971); State v. Smith, 465 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Mo.
1971); State v. Huddleston, 462 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Mo. 1971); State v. Bradford, 462
S.W.2d 664, 671 (Mo. 1971); State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674, 676-77 (Mo. 1970);
State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 483-84, 262 A.2d 868, 871-72, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949
(1970); State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 681-83, 202 S.E.2d 750, 758-59 (1974); Com-
monwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 51, 271 A.2d 257, 262 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1004 (1971); Johnson v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 17, 456 S.W.2d 864, 866 (1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 997 (1971); Noah v. State, 495 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973); Hill v. State, 487 S.W.2d 64, 64-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Reese v. State,
481 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Brown v. State, 476 S.W.2d 699, 700-
01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Hardin v. State, 475 S.W.2d 254, 255-57 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 927 (1972).
26. Kallen, supra note 17, at 150-52.
27. See, e.g., Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich & Christie, Recipe For a lury,
6 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1973, at 37.
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would be to distort that cross section and impanel an unrepresentative
jury.
Most lists of potential jurors today are not representative, so the
research of litigants is to some extent defensive-to reduce the biases
that result from the choice of lists. As long as biased lists are used, such
efforts must continue. The questions that concern trial lawyers operat-
ing in the present system are (1) who shall conduct the voir dire and
(2) what kinds of questions should be asked.
Who Shall Conduct the Voir Dire?
During the 1960's and early 1970's judges sharply curtailed the
opportunity for lawyers to question prospective jurors and increasingly
assumed the task themselves, sometimes with skill and sometimes with
disinterest and disdain. Arguing that lawyer-conducted voir dire takes
excessive time and that lawyers abuse their privilege by asking inappro-
priate questions and indoctrinating the jurors, the judges have now
taken exclusive control over the questioning in thirteen states plus in
the federal system. 28 This controversy is a complicated one, and the
various alternatives, with their supporting arguments, follow.
Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire
The two most important arguments in favor of allowing attorneys
to question prospective jurors directly are that attorney-conducted voir
dire: (1) helps the attorney gain rapport with the jurors and decide how
best to present the evidence to them; and (2) enables the attorney to
secure impartial jurors through the informed use of challenges.29
(1) Rapport. If attorneys are to be able to communicate effective-
ly the position of their clients, they must understand the jurors. Fur-
thermore, an attorney must be able to screen out any jurors who might
have some personality conflict with either the attorney or the client. An
attorney can spot first-impression hostilities flowing from the prospec-
tive juror only if the attorney can engage the prospective juror in a short
conversation. Some attorneys begin by asking, "And where did you
28. See Table II infra.
29. See generally THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR REDUCiNG PREtuDicE
(Kairys ed. 1975); Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN.
L REv. 545 (1975); Padawer-Singer, Singer & Singer, Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An
Essential Safeguard, 57 JuDICATURE 386 (1974). A particularly useful volume in this
field is A. GINGER, JURY SELECrION IN CRIMINAL TRLS (1975). This book presents
numerous examples of attorney-conducted voir dire and provides an excellent discussion
of most of the issues that are still unresolved.
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grow up, Mr. Jones?" simply to see whether the man has an affirmative
outlook on life or is a sourpuss. 0 A juror may dislike the attorney's
clothes, mannerisms, accent or ethnic background, and if such is found
to be the case, the juror must be challenged.
Frequently, the attorneys try to explain elements of their case in a
sympathetic manner to the prospective jurors or to influence the jurors
on questions of law while they are trying to establish "rapport," and it is
this subtle indoctrination that has offended many judges and commenta-
tors who argue that such adversary arguments have no place in the jury
selection phase and should wait until the trial actually begins. The
attorneys respond by saying that they are trying to mold ordinary people
into jurors-for most, a new and unfamiliar role-and that some legal
discussion is necessary.
(2) Informed Use of Challenges. The lawyer and not the judge
exercises peremptory challenges, and the lawyer can do this only after
speaking directly to the prospective juror and thereby evaluating the
juror's personality and prejudices.31  Only if the lawyer is allowed to
look in the juror's eyes while asking a probing question can the lawyer
evaluate the juror's honesty in answering and thus decide carefully
whether to challenge the juror. Without the chance to interrogate the
prospective jurors personally and fully, lawyers are obliged to rely on
information provided by commercial services (sometimes called jury
"stud" books), in those cities that have them, for basic demographic
data about prospective jurors, and on their own intuition, both of which
are uncertain guides.
Even in the case of challenges for cause upon which the judge rules,
attorney-conducted voir dire is essential if hidden prejudices are to be
uncovered because judges generally do not ask pressing and probing
questions that truly explore the prospective juror's attitudes. After the
first .trial of Huey Newton in Oakland in 1968 for the death of a
policeman, his lawyer Charles Garry wrote the following in defense of
attorney-conducted voir dire:
The average judge's idea of voir dire is just to ask, "Can you be
fair?" Once the prospective juror has answered, "Yes," everything
else is considered irrelevant and the judge passes on to the next
juror, even though Adolph Hitler himself would have answered that
question in the affirmative.32
30. Burnett, Voir Dire Examination, 8 FOR THE DEIFENSE 4 (Mar. 1973).
31. See, e.g., People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 835, 506 P.2d 193, 207, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 383 (1973) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
32. Garry, Attacking Racism in Court before Trial, in MiNMIZMNG RACISM I
JuRY TRIAS xxii (A. Ginger ed. 1969).
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Either because of institutional pressures to keep their calendars moving
or because of their lack of sympathy to one or both of the litigants,
many judges question prospective jurors without much interest or enthu-
siasm, hoping that a panel can be quickly assembled and that the trial
can begin. Another experienced California trial attorney wrote in
response to a questionnaire circulated by the California Judicial Council
in 1972 that judges become bored with questioning jurors:
After a judge has gone through this procedure 30 or 40 times, it
gets to be a pretty tedious task. Even a conscientious judge runs
through things rather perfunctorily after awhile. On the other hand
• . . the attorneys. . . have a strong motivating force to make sure
that the juror is going to be fair to their own individual client. If
both [attorneys] are doing this, and are reasonably competent, I
think that the zeal with which this is approached exceeds that of
the judge.33
Only the attorney understands the complexities of the arguments
that he or she will present, and thus only the attorney knows what
prejudices are particularly important to explore. Finally, it is some-
times argued that unless the attorney is allowed to question the jurors,
the jury will in effect be selected by a representative of the government,
the judge, and that this procedure would defeat the purpose for the
jury-namely to protect the citizen from governmental oppression.14
Judge-Conducted Voir Dire
California's recent battle over whether the judge or the attorneys
should question jurors provided an opportunity for the protagonists in
this debate to present their arguments in vivid terms. Early in 1973,
the California Supreme Court abruptly ended the right of attorneys in
that state to carry on what the court described as the "excess rococco
examination" of jurors.35 The following year, the state legislature,
responding to pressure from trial lawyers, enacted a statute that restored
the right of attorneys to participate in the questioning. The court's
strong action and the legislature's quick response serve to illustrate the
depths of passion on this subject.
33. California State Bar Ass'n, Committee on Rules of Court Procedure, Report
and Recommendation Re: 1972 Voir Dire Procedures, Exhibit B, at 4, Dec. 5, 1972.
34. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1972, at 46, col. 8 (letter from Paul G. Chevigny, staff
counsel, New York Civil Liberties Union).
35. People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 819, 506 P.2d 193, 195, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369,
371 (1973).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West Cune. Supp. 1975).
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The California Supreme Court's majority opinion states:
We conclude that direct examination by counsel has perverted
the purpose of voir dire, and transformed the examination of jurors
into a contest between counsel for the selection of a jury partial
to his cause and for the attainment of rapport with the jurors so
selected, a contest which may overshadow the actual trial on the
merits.3 7
This conclusion is particularly remarkable because the statute on the
books at that time explicitly stated that the trial judge "shall permit
reasonable examination of prospective jurors by counsel for the people
and for the defendant."3 8 The legislative history of this statute unmis-
takably indicated that it was designed to ensure that lawyers could
question the jurors, because this statute was modified from an earlier
proposed version which stated that the trial judge "may, in his
discretion, permit reasonable examination. . ... 39 Moreover, legisla-
tive attempts to curtail lawyer-conducted voir dire in 1971 and 1972
foundered unsuccessfully.40 Nonetheless, this highly respected court
reached out to nullify the legislation for no apparent constitutional
reason-an example of the judiciary's strong desire to exert greater
control over the jury selection procedure.
The United States Supreme Court took the right to question pros-
pective jurors from attorneys in federal trials twenty-nine years earlier
when they approved Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure:
Examination. The court may permit the defendant or his at-
torney and the attorney for the government to conduct the exam-
ination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination.
In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or his attor-
ney and the attorney for the government to supplement the exam-
ination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the
parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.41
A 1970 study of 219 federal judges showed that 53.4 percent
questioned jurors by themselves, 31.1 percent allowed attorneys to ask
some supplemental questions, 13.2 percent allowed attorneys to ask all
the questions, and 2.3 percent authorized the questioning of jurors by a
37. 8 Cal. 3d at 828, 506 P.2d at 202, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
38. Ch. 605, § 1, Cal. Stats. 1927, at 1039.
39. 8 Cal. 3d at 822, 506 P.2d at 197, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 834 n.1, 506 P.2d at 206 n.1, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 382 n.1 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting).
41. FED. R. C iM. P. 24(a).
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clerk or the attorneys outside the judge's presence.4 2 The two reasons
the California Supreme Court offered to justify curtailing attorney-
conducted voir dire are the "inordinate time consumed in the process of
the selection of jurors"43 and the "abuses" that attorneys engage in when
they ask their questions." We will address the time question shortly,
but first let us be clear about what the judges mean by "abuses."
The judges assert that a litigant has no right to a favorable jury, but
only a right to an impartial jury, and that any questioning that tends to
"indoctrinate" the jurors or to obtain a jury sympathetic to one side or
the other is improper.4" Only if the judge is at the questioning helm can
we be sure that no abusive, embarrassing or improper questions will be
asked of jurors. Lawyers sometimes pose hypothetical questions that
are related to the facts of the case and that may sneak in evidence that is
not admissible in trial. A prosecutor, for instance, once asked a pros-
pective juror if he would convict a defendant of rape if the prosecution
proved that the defendant had raped and communicated venereal dis-
ease to a little girl.46 Such a question, by implying that the girl has such
a disease, predisposes the juror to infer that rape has occurred and
perhaps precludes an objective weighing of the evidence. Even if the
judge intervenes and does not allow the juror to respond, the damage
has been done because the notion has been implanted in the juror's
mind.
The Federal Judicial Conference's Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System phrased the matter as follows in a 1960 report:
The trial judge, sitting daily in the trial of cases, both civil and
criminal, knows that bias may exist, both because of the nature of
the parties involved and -because of the general nature of the case
itself. Experienced as he thus is along these general lines, and with
the potential jurors before him. . . he can thus best ask a single
question directed to them along each of such lines. Not only so,
but such general questioning coming from him, the impartial ar-
biter, is much more likely to prove acceptable to counsel on both
sides than would a similar question asked by counsel on one side.
Therefore, where the jury is selected in the presence of the judge,
the Committee recommends that all questions should be asked by
the judge for effectiveness and expedition. 47
42. The Jury System in the Federal Courts (Works of the Committee on the Op-
eration of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the United States 1966-73)
(West Publishing Co.) 174.
43. 8 Cal. 3d at 825, 506 P.2d at 199, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 824, 828, 506 P.2d at 199, 202, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 375, 378.
46. Fields v. State, 203 Ark. 1046, 159 S.W.2d 745 (1942).
47. Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System, The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 467 (1961).
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Perhaps this is so, but the implications of this approach should be clearly
understood. By taking the questioning of jurors away from attorneys
and entrusting it to the judge, a decision is being made that rejects the
adversarial approach toward justice and moves toward the inquisitorial
approach used in most of Europe where the judiciary dominates the trial
process. In the adversarial system, as it has been traditionally under-
stood in the Anglo-American world, justice is achieved by pitting two
sides against each other, allowing them to present their contrasting
versions of a factual situation to a jury which then determines the just
result of the controversy. The judge moderates the confrontation but
does not play an active role in deciding what evidence is presented or
what verdict is reached. In the inquisitorial system, the judge decides
what evidence is needed, conducts much of the questioning, and the
lawyers play a more passive role of responding to the judge's requests.
Many of the judges in the United States are discontented with their
passive role and are now assuming greater responsibilities and power
over what takes place in their courtroom. The desire of judges to
question prospective jurors themselves is part of this movement, and the
dramatic tour de force of the California Supreme Court in People v.
Crowe,48 just discussed, is evidence of the lengths to which the judiciary
will go. But, one might ask, why stop here? If the desire is simply for
an impartial jury, why not strip opposing counsel of the right to exercise
peremptory challenges altogether? All partial jurors are presumably
excused for cause by the judge. What need, then, for peremptory
challenges, made without announced reason?
In California, the legislature intervened to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision in People v. Crowe. In September 1974, the legisla-
ture added to the requirement of Penal Code section 1078 that the judge
"shall permit reasonable examination of prospective jurors by counsel
for the people and for the defendant" the explicit words "such examina-
tion to be conducted orally and directly by counsel. '49
In those jurisdictions that still empower the judges to conduct all
the questioning, many judges take the assignment seriously, but many
others simply go through the motions. An example of the worst kind of
judicial questioning-an example that is unfortunately not unique-is
offered by the procedures of Judge Julius J. Hoffman in the 1969-1970
Chicago Conspiracy Trial. A group of perhaps 100 prospective jurors
was summoned to the federal courtroom and Judge Hoffman asked
48. 8 Cal. 3d 815, 506 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West Cum. Supp. 1975).
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them all the following questions: ,(a) whether they were acquainted
with employees of the F.B.I. or the Justice Department; (b) whether
they were acquainted with the defendants, their lawyers or their asso-
ciates; (c) whether they would follow the law as given to them by Judge
Hoffman; (d) whether they could keep an open mind until the end of
the trial; (e) whether they could treat the testimony of a government
agent the same as that of any other witness; (f) whether prior jury serv-
ice would prevent them from being impartial; and (g) whether any rea-
son existed that would prevent them from being fair and impartial jurors
in that case. Fifty-six of those assembled stated without explanation that
they could not be impartial and were excused without further ado by
agreement of the two sides. Two others gave particular reasons why
they could not be impartial and were also excused.
Twelve of the persons who remained were then called into the jury
box and they were individually asked questions about their families and
occupations. Two persons who said they worked for the federal gov-
ernment were asked whether that would influence their judgment. An-
other was asked whether his father's job as a police officer would affect
his judgment. All replied they could be impartial. The group was then
asked whether any of them had close relatives or friends employed by a
law enforcement agency or by any other agency of local, state or federal
government. Five answered "yes," but asserted that their judgment
would not be affected thereby. This question was not asked of the suc-
ceeding persons who entered the jury box.
The defense submitted a long list of questions to Judge Hoffman
about the war in Vietnam, racism, the youth culture and the political
associations of the prospective jurors, but he refused to ask them be-
cause they were not "germane" to the issues presented by the trial.
Defense lawyers were not permitted to ask any questions of the pros-
pective jurors. A jury was selected after the twenty-four persons were
examined, the defendants having exercised ten peremptory challenges
and the government having exercised only two.50
How many things did Judge Hoffman do wrong? His first error-
and one of the grounds on which the convictions were later reversed-
was to ask the questions about bias to the group as a whole rather than
to the individual jurors.5 Few persons are brave enough to talk about
50. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 366-67 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 970 (1973).
51. Id. at 367, 369. See Patriarea v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (1st Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1022 (1969); People v. Barrett, 207 Cal. 47, 276 P. 1003
(1929); People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81, 273 P. 575 (1928).
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their prejudices in public, fewer still to raise their hand in response to a
general question and thus to single themselves out for such a discus-
sion.52
Judge Hoffman's second departure from an ideal standard was to
ask questions that were too general. Even the California Supreme
Court in the 1973 Crowe decision conceded that specific questions
requiring the juror to talk rather than simply give short answers are
necessary if bias is to be uncovered. 53
Finally, Judge Hoffman arguably erred in not allowing the attor-
neys to ask some additional questions after he finished his inquiry. The
American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Trial by Jury5 4 origi-
nally stated that the judge should ask opposing counsel to submit
additional questions after the judge finishes questioning, and that the
judge should ask the questions that are appropriate.55 This suggestion
was revised to permit the supplemental questioning to be conducted by
the lawyers themselves, on the theory that more time would be saved by
this procedure. The judge can, of course, control -the additional ques-
tioning if it becomes improper.56
This compromise is the best approach if voir dire is to be retained.
To vest the trial judge with absolute control over voir dire would
challenge the very foundation of our adversary system, and reduce the
possibility of exposing bias in controversial cases. To give lawyers
uncontrolled discretion over the conduct of the questioning, on the other
52. See United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299, 1303-04 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 929 (1972). Some judges now try to question each prospective juror
in private, so that other jurors will not be able to pick up answers that will permit them
to be excused if they so wish, or to remain on the jury if they want to try the case.
In 1973, a judge in Santa Cruz, California (with the approval of both attorneys) actu-
ally banned the press from the questioning of jurors in a sensational murder trial on
the theory that other prospective jurors might read about his questioning. People v. Su-
perior Court of Santa Cruz, No. 33516 (Cal. Ct. App. Dist. 1, Div. 4 July 12, 1973).
This practice goes too far. It violates the public's right to know, which is guaranteed
through the First Amendment, see United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1972)), to accomplish a goal that could just as easily be achieved by barring prospective
jurors from reading newspapers and watching television news concerning the trial.
53. People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 831 n.31, 506 P.2d 193, 204 n.31, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 380 n.31 (1973).
54. A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATrNG TO TRIAL BY JURY (1968) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. PROJEcT ON MNI-MUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
55. Id. § 2.4, at 63.
56. Id. § 2.4 (supp.), at 2.
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hand, sometimes wastes valuable time and energy. Both sides should be
flexible and each should play a role.
Voir Dire Without a Judge
Some courts in New York State, in Los Angeles, and in a few
federal districts select ,their jurors without the aid of a judge.57  The
jurors are summoned into a commissioner's office and are questioned
either by a jury commissioner or by the opposing attorneys. Sometimes
the commissioner leaves the room, allowing the attorneys to be alone
with the prospective jurors. Challenges are -then made as usual and are
ruled upon by the commissioner. Only if an intricate point of law arises
is a judge called in to decide the matter. This procedure obviously saves
the time of the judge, but may take longer in toto than the procedure
combining the talents of the judge and the lawyers.
No Voir Dire At All (Use of Questionnaires)
In some Boston courts no voir dire is conducted. The attorneys
must base their challenges on lists of jurors that provide each jurors
name, address, military status, sex, occupation, name of spouse and
name of employer. 58 This limited information is obviously inadequate
for any serious exercise of challenges, but it might be possible to devise
a more sophisticated questionnaire that would be filled out by each pro-
spective juror and would eliminate the need for many of the questions
asked in open court.
Such a questionnaire system was used in February 1974 to impanel
a jury to try the most serious mass murder ever committed in Washing-
ton, D.C. Six hundred and fifty jurors were summoned, and all were
given a three-page questionnaire to fill out. The questionnaire asked if
sitting on a sequestered jury for six to twelve weeks would cause
"extreme difficulty and hardship," if the prospective juror had heard
about the crime and had a "fixed opinion" about the defendants' guilt,
and finally if the prospective juror or any close relative had been a
victim of or had been arrested for a crime like the murder at issue. The
57. National Conference of Metropolitan Courts, Final Report on the Jury Ad-
Administration Project 23, Mar. 1973 [hereinafter cited as National Conference of Me-
tropolitan Courts]; Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical
Study, 44 S. CA. L. REV. 916, 931-34 (1971); Report of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee on the Operation of the Jury System, The Jury System in the Federal Courts,
26 F.R.D. 409, 467 (1961).
58. National Conference of Metropolitan Courts, supra note 57, at 21.
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questionnaire was then fed into a computer which eliminated 261 of the
prospective jurors and said that 389 were qualified to serve. Two
hundred seventy of the 389 were randomly selected for further question-
ing conducted by the judge, and after individual questioning ranging
from the juror's religion to previous jury service, another 100 were
eliminated "for cause." Names were randomly selected from the re-
maining 170, and the attorneys exercised their peremptory challenges in
the usual fashion until 12 jurors and 12 alternates were selected to try
the case.5"
The Time and Efficiency Arguments
Judges who have advocated taking over completely the conduct of
voir dire have always complained about the inefficiency of attorney-
conducted voir dire, but they have rarely documented the time actually
involved. Chief Justice Warren Burger told the National Conference on
the Judiciary at Williamsburg, Virginia, in March 1971, that the voir
dire has "become in itself a major piece of litigation consuming days or
weeks, ' 60 apparently in response to a few major political trials that had
generated massive publicity. Trials that are notorious or involve politi-
cal controversy always raise special problems in the selection of jurors.
Either because of the political controversies surrounding the defendants
or because of the sensational media accounts of the crimes, many-
perhaps most-prospective jurors will have formed tentative opinions on
the matter and many will find it difficult to pass objectively upon the
evidence offered to them. If the goal is to impanel an "impartial" jury,
extensive time must be expended to discover whether the prospective
jurors are tainted, and this time must be spent whether the questioning is
conducted by the lawyers or by -the judge.
The relevant question concerns the amount of time consumed by
the questioning of jurors in the ordinary personal injury civil suit or the
relatively routine felony trial. Statistics are, of course, elusive in this
area, but attempts have been made to produce reliable numbers. The
chart that follows includes as many of the recent studies as I have
found.
59. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1974, at 29, col. 1.
60. L.A. Times, Mar. 13, 1971, at 17, col. 1.
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Table I
Time Required to Select Juries
Method of Jury Examination, Average Time in Source
Type of Trial, Minutes From
Date and Place Start of Voir Dire
Until Jury is
Sworn
A. ATTORNEY-CONDUCTED
VOIR DIRE:
(i) CIVIL TRIALS:
1. Late 1950's-A Midwest
Federal Court.
2. 1969-Los Angeles,
California ('Test Judges")
3. 1969-Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia ("Non Test Judges")
4. 1969 Los Angeles-Based
Study of Judges in other
urban areas of California
5. 1969 RuTGERs-CAMDEN
L.J. study:
(a) Estimates by 65 New
Jersey Trial Lawyers
(b) Estimates by 27 New
Jersey Trial Judges
6. 1970 California Judicial
Council Survey
7. 1973-Harris County
(Houston), Texas (4
month study)
30 Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations:
An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL.
L. REv. 503 (1965).
111 Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick,
Expediting Voir Dire: An
Empirical Study, 44 S. CA..
L. REV. 916,961 (1971). 'Test
Judges" are those who impaneledjurors using attorney-conducted
voir dire and judge-conducted
voir dire during different
periods in 1969.
106 Same as #2, at 967. "Non
Test Judges" are those Los
Angeles judges who did not
experiment with judge-conducted
voir dire during 1969 and
simply continued to impaneljuries allowing attorney-conducted
voir dire as usual.
About 75
About 75
Same as #2, at 965. These
statistics were assembled from
17 of the most populous California
counties.
Note, Judge Conducted Voir Dire
as a Time-Saving Trial Technique,
2 RuTGERS-CAMDEN LJ. 161, 184
(1970).
123 Judicial Council of California
Superior Court Committee, Report
and Recommendations Concern-
ing Rules 228 and 516 Relating to
the Examination of Prospective
Civil Trial Jurors, Oct. 25, 1972
(mimeographed staff draft).
114 Stevens & Munsterman (Bird
Engineering-Research Associates,
Inc.), Juror Usage in Houston,
Harris County, Texas (1974).
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Method Time Source
8. 1973-Hennepin County
(Minneapolis), Minnesota(2 month study)
9. 1973-Atlanta, Georgia
(ii) CRIMINAL TRIALS:
10. 1969 RUTGERS-CAMDEN
L.J. study:
(a) Estimates by 65 New
Jersey Trial Lawyers
(b) Estimates by 27 New
Jersey Trial Judges
(c) Estimates by 10 New
Jersey County Prosecutors
11. 1973-Denver County,
Colorado
(a) 12-person juries
(39 trials)
(b) 3-person juries
(14 trials)
12. 1973-El Paso County
(Colorado Springs),
Colorado
(a) 12-person juries
(28 trials)
(b) 3-person juries
(19 trials)
13. 1973-Hennepin
County (Minneapolis),
Minnesota (2 month study)
14. 1973-Harris County
(Houston), Texas
(4 month study)
15. 1973-Atlanta,
Georgia
(iii) ALL TRIALS:
16. 1973-Denver County,
Colorado
6-person juries(110 trials)
17. 1973-El Paso County
(Colorado Springs),
Colorado
6-person juries
(26 trials)
18. 1973-El Paso, Texas
59 Munsterman (Bird Engineering-
Research Associates, Inc.), Juror
Utilization in Hennepin County
Courts (1974).
78 Bird Engineering-Research
Associates, Inc. (unpublished
data on file at Hastings Con-
stitutional Law Quarterly).
Same as #5, at p. 184.
About 160
210
About 165
Stevens & Munsterman (Bird
Engineering-Research Associates,
Inc.), Juror Utilization in
Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver El
Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo
Counties, Colorado (1974).
Same as #11.
240
36
108 Same as #8.
96 Same as #7.
86 Same as # 9.
96 Same as #11.
78 Same as #11.
138 Bird Engineering-Research
Associates, Inc., Juror Utilization
in Prince George's County of the
Seventh Judicial Circuit of
Maryland (1974).
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Time Required to Select Juries
Time Source
B. JUDGE-CONDUCTED
VOIR DIRE:
(i) CIVIL TRIALS:
19. 1967 Estimate by
William J. Campbell
Chief Judge for the Northern
District of Illinois
20. 1969-Los Angeles,
California
21. 1969 RuTGERs-CAmDEN
J. Study:
(a) Estimates by 65 New
Jersey Trial Lawyers
(b) Estimates by 27 New
Jersey Trial Judges
22. 1971-New Jersey:
(a) 12-person juries
(b) 6-person juries
23. 1971-U.S. District
Court for the Eastern
District of New York
24. 1971-U.S. District
Court for the District of
Columbia:
(a) 12-person juries
(b) 6-person juries
25. 1971-District of
Columbia (91 trials)
26. 1972 California
Judicial Council Survey
27. 1973-Prince George's
County, Md. (48 trials)
90 Kerr, Varieties in Jury Selection
Methods, 44 F.R.D. 277, 278,
284 (1967).
64 Same as #2, at p. 959.
Same as #5, at p. 184.
About 75
About 75
The Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration, Inc., A Comparison
of Six- and Twelve-Member Civil
Juries in New Jersey Superior
and County Courts (1972).
75 The Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration, Inc., Suggestions
for Improving Juror Utilizations
in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District
of New York, Aug. 31, 1971
(mimeographed).
Pabst, Statistical Studies of the
Costs of Six-Man Versus
Twelve-Man Juries, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 326, 327 (1972).
58 Pabst, Juror Waiting Time
Reduction, June 1971 (National
Technical Information Service,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
87 (in court)
+ 38 (pre and
post examination
conferences) =
125 (total time) Same as #6.
20 Same as #18.
Method
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Time Required to Select Juries
Method Time Source
28. 1970-73-Federal
District Courts in Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire & Rhode Island
(a) 12-person juries
(40 trials)
(b) 6-person juries
(38 trials)
29. 1973-Essex County,
N.J.
(a) District Courts
(6-person juries)
(31 trials)(b) County and Superior
Courts
(i) 12-person juries
(11 trials)
(ii) 6-person juries
(100 trials)
(ii) CRIMINAL TRIALS:
30. 1967 Estimate by
William J. Campbell
Chief Judge for the Northern
District of Illinois
31. 1969 RUTGERs-CAMDEN
LJ. study:
(a) Estimates by 65 N.J.
Trial Lawyers(b) Estimates by 27 NJ.
Trial Judges
(c) Estimates by 10 N.J.
County Prosecutors
32. 1971-U.S. District
Court for the Eastern
District of New York
33. 1971-New York City
Study:
The Bronx
Manhattan
34. 1971-District of
Columbia (154 trials)
35. 1973-Prince George's
County, Md. (46 trials)
36. 1973-Essex County,
NJ. (177 trials)
Beiser, The Trial Jury: Empirical
and Normative Considerations,
(text of address to 1973 Annual
Meeting, American Political
Science Association, New Orleans,
Louisiana, Sept. 4-8, 1973).
Pabst and Munsterman (Bird
Engineering-Research Associates,
24 Inc.), Juror Utilization in Essex
County, NJ., Courts (1974).
102
56
180 Same as #19.
Same as #5.
47
45
About 80
85 Same as #23.
Subcommittee on the Jury System
of the New York Departmental
150 Committee for the Court
203 Administration of the Appellate
Division, First and Second
Departments, Interim Report,
Nov. 13, 1972 (mimeographed
report).
57 Same as #25.
20 Same as # 18.
74 Same as #29.
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Time Required to Select Juries
Method Time Source
(iii) ALL TRIALS:
37. 1960 and 1967
Estimates by Judge Ewing
T. Kerr, U.S. District Judge
for the District of Wyoming
(Jurors are questioned col-
lectively rather than
individually)
38. 1971-U.S. District
Court for the Southern
District of New York
(8 trials)
39. 1973-Newark, New
Jersey
C. VOIR DIRE WITHOUT
A JUDGE:
CIVIL TRIALS:
40. 1970 Los Angeles
Study
41. 1972 California
Judicial Council Study
20-30 Same as #19, and Proceedings
of the Seminar on Practice and
Procedure under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28
F.R.D. 37, 185 (1960).
64 Federal Judicial Center,
Guidelines for Improving Juror
Utilization in United States
District Courts, October 1972.
72 Same as #18.
135 Same as# 2, at 935.
82 (in court)
+23 (pre and
post examination
conferences) =
105 (total time)
Same as #6.
These surveys and estimates were made in different places, in
different contexts, and many variables enter into the picture that are not
carefully sorted out. Nonetheless, several generalizations can be made
from this data:
1. The time differences among these various procedures are not
dramatic. Although it is not insignificant that fifteen minutes or a half
hour might be saved in each trial, the differences are not dramatic
enough to lead to a restructuring of the conduct of voir dire if other
factors that relate to the due process rights of litigants are involved.
Chief Justice Burger's alarm about excessive delays is not justified if one
examines the normal trial.
2. Furthermore, the evidence does not indicate conclusively that
any of the systems is necessarily less time consuming. The California
Judicial Council's surveys in the early 1970's produced the seemingly
incongruous conclusion that judge-conducted voir dire in civil cases
actually takes two minutes longer than attorney-conducted voir dire,
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when the time for the pre- and post-examination conferences is included
-as it should be if the real concern is time. The other surveys and
estimates ignored this component. An even more dramatic disparity
appears if the results of the New York City study, where judge-conducted
voir dire in criminal cases took about three hours on the average, are
compared to Professor Broeder's findings, where attorney-conducted
voir dire in civil cases (under the careful scrutiny of a respected judge)
took only a half hour.
3. Variables other than how the questioning is conducted are
probably more important. We must conclude that other factors are at
least as important as the issue of who conducts the questioning. A
careful and respected judge can guide an attorney's questions in the
normal case so that it proceeds expeditiously and without "abuses." A
careless or indifferent judge might abuse the prospective jurors as much
as a sloppy attorney, or worse still, conduct only perfunctory question-
ing. The important considerations are thus not who asks the questions,
but what kinds of questions are asked and how the attorneys and the
judge relate to each other. This leads to the final question of this
inquiry.
What is the Scope of Voir Dire?
The major dispute regarding the scope of permissible questioning
is whether it is proper to inquire into areas not related to the challenges
for cause but which might form the basis for a peremptory challenge.
The United States Supreme Court stated specifically in 1965 that ques-
tioning to form the basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge is
appropriate: "The voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and
probing, operating as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories
. . "61 The opposite rule is in force in California, however, where
the California Supreme Court restricts questioning to areas relevant to a
challenge for cause: "It is now well settled in this state that a juror may
not be examined on voir dire solely for the purpose of laying the
foundation for the exercise of a peremptory challenge."6' 2 The argu-
ment in favor of the California rule is that the grounds for challenges for
cause are broad enough to permit sufficient questioning to allow for the
61. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965). But see Ham v. South Caro-
lina, 409 U.S. 524, 527-28 (1973).
62. People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 598, 265 P. 230, 235 (1928), quoted with ap-
proval in People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 830, 506 P.2d 193, 203, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369,
379 (1973) and People v. Rigney, 55 Cal. 2d 236, 244, 359 P.2d 23, 27, 10 Cal. Rptr.
625, 629 (1961).
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intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. This argument, however,
reduces the significance of peremptory challenges and turns them into
mere extensions of the challenges for cause. In California, the exercise
of peremptories cannot be genuinely arbitrary because the litigants do
not have the information they may need to express their own arbitrary
choices. Indeed, if the California rule is to govern, why allow peremp-
tory challenges at all?
In California, as in most states, 3 a prospective juror can be chal-
lenged for cause (1) if the juror is related to a party to the litigation,64
(2) if the juror has a unique interest in 'the subject matter,65 (3) if the
juror has served in a related case or on the grand jury that indicted the
accused,66 or most importantly (4) if the juror has "a state of mind" that
will prevent her or him from "acting with entire impartiality and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of either . . . party . *."..6" The
difficult question is how to define that important "state of mind."
Chief Justice John Marshall, presiding at Aaron Burr's trial, ruled
that the United States Constitution demands that a jury in a criminal
trial must be free from "those strong and deep impressions which will
close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to
them . "...-68 He said that "light impressions" may be presumed
capable of yielding to evidence and are not therefore capable of render-
ing the jury partial.69 Thus, he defined "impartial" as being free from
the dominant influence of knowledge acquired outside the courtroom.
This is a noble definition, but it leaves many questions unresolved.
How is the court to determine whether a juror has been dominantly
influenced by outside events? Where is the dividing line between
"deep" and "light" impressions? Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite wrote
in 1879 that:
The courts are not agreed as to the knowledge upon which the
opinion must rest in order to render the juror incompetent, or
63. See, e.g., American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure, § 277, reprinted
in A.B.A. PROJECr ON MINIMum SrANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 54, at
69-69.
64. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 602 (West Cum. Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1074 (West 1970).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1971) (it is reversible
error to refuse to ask the prospective jurors, "Have you or any member of your family
ever been the victim of a robbery or other crime?" in a bank robbery trial).
66. See note 64 supra.
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1073 (West 1970). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1074
(West 1970); CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 602 (West Cm. Supp. 1975).
68. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (No. 14,692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
69. Id.
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whether the opinion must be accompanied by malice or ill-will; but
all unite in holding that it must be founded on some evidence, and
be more than a mere impression. Some say it must -be positive;
others, that it must be decided and substantial; others, fixed; and,
still others, deliberate and settled. All concede, however, that, if
hypothetical only, the partiality is not so manifest as to necessarily
set the juror aside.70
In the case before the Supreme Court at the time, the district attorney
had asked one of the prospective jurors, "Have you formed or expressed
any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of this charge?" The juror
responded, "I believe I have formed an opinion,"'71 but the Court held
that it was proper nonetheless to allow him to remain on the jury
because such a belief is merely a "hypothetical opinion" and falls far
short of establishing such partiality that nothing is left for the "con-
science or discretion" of the juror.72
Most modem problems in this area involve either (1) pretrial
publicity, or (2) racial, ethnic, political, religious or lifestyle prejudice
that interferes with impartial judgments. It is of course impossible to
expect jurors to come into court with no preconceptions at all on the
issues to be tried, and if we were to insist on such a rule, all alert citizens
would be excluded from jury duty. John Marshall said at the Burr
trial:
It would seem to the court that to say that any man who had
formed an opinion on any fact conducive to the final decision of
the case would therefore be considered as disqualified from serving
on the jury, would exclude intelligent and observing men, whose
minds were really in a situation to decide upon the whole case ac-
cording to the testimony, and would perhaps -be applying the letter
of the rule requiring an impartial jury with a strictness which is not
necessary for the preservation of the rule itself.73
And in a modem context, Judge John Sirica asked the panel assembled
to consider the first Watergate indictments in January 1973 whether
they had heard of the case, fully expecting the entire panel to respond
affirmatively. When a handful indicated they had not heard of the
70. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1879) (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 147.
72. Id. at 156.
73. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (No. 14,692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the approach taken by Chief Justice John
Marshall and District Judge John Sirica in the recent case of Murphy v. Florida, 421
U.S. 794 (1975). Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for the majority stated that
"[qualified jurors need not ... be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved"
and that the governing standard was whether the prospective juror exhibited "a partiality
that could not be laid aside." Id. at 799-800.
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scandal, he expressed astonishment and indicated that those persons
ought perhaps to be the least qualified to sit on the jury.74
Some balance is needed to separate those few whose inflamed
passions make it impossible to sit impartially from the rest who can
conscientiously concentrate on the evidence presented at trial.7 5 When
the problem is that of pretrial publicity in, for instance, a sensational
murder trial, careful questioning of the prospective jurors can usually
separate those who have developed a knee-jerk response to the case from
those who have maintained an open perspective on the facts.
When the problem is that of racial, ethnic or life-style prejudice,
the feelings may be so deeply ingrained in the prospective juror that
much more probing questioning is required. Black Panther attorney
Charles Garry has perhaps elevated the science of probing for racial
prejudice to its highest level. His techniques have been reproduced in a
book entitled Minimizing Racism in Jury Trials,76 which reprints many
of the questions he asked of jurors before the first Huey Newton trial in
1968.
A question such as the following may make a juror pause and thus
open up a discussion of racism:
If you were staying at the house of two friends-one white and
one black-and if you forgot your toothbrush, whose would you
borrow?
Or if the accused is a Chicano, the jurors might be asked:
How would you feel if your child married a Chicano?
Do you feel nervous when driving through the barrio?
The juror must be encouraged to talk about some personal experience if
any true discussion of racist feeling is to occur.
Traditionally, this line of reasoning has been extended to other
types of potential prejudices that may exist against a litigant or defend-
ant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled
in 1943 that an accused Jehovah's Witness could ask prospective jurors
whether they might be prejudiced against Jehovah's Witnesses even
though religion was not an issue at trial.77 The United States Supreme
Court ruled during ,the early Cold War days that in a case involving
contempt of the House Un-American Activities Committee prospective
74. Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2036 (1975).
75. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961); Silverthorne v. United
States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968).
76. Edited by Ann Fagan Ginger, and published by the National Lawyers Guild
(Box 673, Berkeley, Calif.) in 1969.
77. United States v. Daily, 139 F.2d 7, 9 (7th Cir. 1943).
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jurors who were government employees had to be asked about the
possible influence of a "Loyalty Order" on their ability to remain
impartial7 8 The "Loyalty Order" had said that special vigilance was to
be exercised to ensure that disloyal persons were not allowed into the
federal government, 79 and government employees might therefore be
reluctant to acquit an accused Communist for fear that they might then
be suspect as disloyal themselves. The possible prejudice against left-
of-center defendants was, therefore, a necessary inquiry to ensure the
possibility of a fair trial.
Later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
ruled that a defendant accused of evading wagering taxes could ask
prospective jurors whether they held religious scruples against gam-
bling."' In 1972, on reviewing the 1969-1970 Chicago Conspiracy
Trial, the same court held that this right to inquire extended to any other
significant possible prejudice, such as prejudice against antiwar activists
and against the youth culture."' The rationale for -these decisions was
simply that: "We do not believe that the court could safely assume,
without inquiry, that the veniremen had no serious prejudice on this
subject, or could recognize such prejudices and lay them aside."8"
Two months after the Seventh Circuit's strong opinion on the
desirability of inquiring into all possible prejudices that may interfere
with a fair trial, the United States Supreme Court reversed this position
and ruled that appellate review over the questioning of jurors would be
limited."' Gene Ham, a young, bearded black who had been active in
civil rights activity in South Carolina, was convicted of possessing
marijuana and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. Prior to
the trial, the judge had asked the prospective jurors whether they were
conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against him, and whether they
could be fair and impartial. The judge refused, however, to ask wheth-
er the jurors were prejudiced against Negroes, whether they would be
influenced by the term "black," whether they could disregard the de-
fendant's beard, and whether they had been influenced by local publicity
involving the drug problem.
78. Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1947).
79. Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1950).
80. United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617, 632 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961).
81. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 366-70 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 970 (1973).
82. Id. at 368.
83. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
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In an opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge had erred by not posing
the racial prejudice question but that the Constitution does not require
that questions about beards be asked. Justice Rehnquist said that he
was unable to "constitutionally distinguish possible prejudice against
beards from a host of other possible similar prejudices," and therefore
would not require that any questions about beards be asked.8 4  Al-
though Justices Douglas and Marshall argued in their partial dissents
that the Sixth Amendment's requirement of an "impartial jury"8 5 man-
dates that such questions be asked,86 the majority opinion makes no
mention of that amendment. The following year, in another opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated that Ham required ques-
tioning about racial prejudice only "in certain situations".8 7 The effect
of this opinion is to vest almost unreviewable discretion in the trial judge
over what other questions are appropriate.
These decisions are but another assertion of judicial supremacy-
and another curtailment of the opportunity for a fair trial in politically
volatile contexts. They seem also to reverse ,the language in Swain v.
Alabama,8 that had elevated to constitutional dimensions the require-
ment of a free-wheeling voir dire to lay the framework for peremptory
challenges. And they may eliminate the need for any voir dire at all
except for questions about racial prejudice in "certain" situations.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court
and other judges throughout the land have been trying to limit the
questioning of jurors whenever possible, so that trial judges increasingly
have total control of the process. This tightening of the voir dire has
come about because of a concern for the time required by extensive
questioning and an institutional desire to speed trials whenever possible.
Little concern has been given to the human costs involved in abandon-
ing the voir dire, the costs of sending innocent persons to jail because
their jurors are not free from prejudice against them.
84. Id. at 528.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
86. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 531-34 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
87. Hanling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 140 (1974) (emphasis added). See
also Ristiano v. Ross, 44 U.S. L.W. 4305 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1976).
88. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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If the lists from which jurors are picked were truly representative of
the entire population, then little danger would result from the abandon-
ment of the voir dire and peremptory challenges. In fact, the juries
would become more diverse and more representative of the communi-
ty.89 It is difficult to sort out the many prejudices we all hold and it
may be better to accept a jury with representative prejudices instead of
trying to impanel one with no prejudices.
But, with biased lists in use, the voir dire is an important tool to
enable attorneys to discover prejudice and to form the basis for chal-
lenges for cause and peremptory challenges. With the present lists in
use, the abandonment of the voir dire and the placing of jury selection in
the hands of the trial judge means that the jury will be less a voice of the
people and more an extension of the government.
Table H1
Voir Dire-State by State
KEY: Judge-indicates that the judge has unfettered control
of the questioning of jurors. Attorneys may submit
questions to the judge, which the judge may or may not
ask the jurors, and the judge can in his or her discretion
allow the attorneys to ask questions directly of the jur-
ors after the judge has concluded questioning.
Attorney-indicates that the attorneys have primary
control of the questioning of the jurors, subject to ju-
dicial control only for abuse.
Judge plus attorney-indicates that the judge will gen-
erally begin the questioning with standard questions on
bias, but that the attorneys will then have a right to
question the jurors directly at the conclusion of the
judge's questions. Local practices differ and manyjudges have their own individual approaches to this
problem.
Alabama Attorney (ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 52 (1959)).
Alaska Judge (ALASKA R. Civ. P. 47(a); ALASKA R. CRIM. P.
24(a)).
Arizona Civil: judge (Aiuz. R. Civ. P. 47(b)); Criminal:
judge plus attorney (Axm. R. CRaM. P. 18.5).
Arkansas Judge (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-226 (1962)).
California Attorney (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West Cum.
Supp. 1975)).
Colorado Judge plus attorney (CoLo. R. Civ. P. 47(a); CoLO.
R. CRiM. P. 24(a)).
89. Statistics illustrating this phenomenon appear in another chapter of my forth-
coming book.
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Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Attorney (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-240 (Supp.
1975)).
Judge (DEL. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 47(a); DEL.
SUPER. CT. (CiuM.) R. 24(a)).
Judge (D.C.R. Civ. P. 47(a); D.C.R. CiuM. P. 24.
(a)).
Civil: attorney (FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(b)); Criminal:
judge plus attorney (FLA. R. CIuM. P. 3.300(b)).
Civil: attorney; Criminal: judge plus attorney (GA.
CODE ANN. § 59-705 (1965)).
Attorney (HAWAII REV. STAT. § 635-27 (1968)).
Attorney (See State v. Hoagland, 39 Idaho 405, 417-
18, 228 P. 314, 318-19 (1925); Hurt v. Monumental
Mercury Mining Co., 35 Idaho 295, 299, 206 P. 184,
185 (1922)).
Judge plus attorney (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 234
(1968)).
Judge plus attorney (IND. R. TRIAL P. 47(A)).
Attorney (.IowA R. Crv. P. 187(b); IOWA CODE §
779.6 (1950)).
Attorney (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-247(a) (1964)).
Civil: judge (KY. R. Civ. P. 47.01); Criminal: judge
plus attorney (Ky. R. CRIM. P. 9.38).
Attorney (LA. CODE Civ. PRO. art. 1763 (1961); LA.
CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 786 (1967)).
Civil: judge (ME. R. Civ. P. 47(a)); Criminal: judge
plus attorney (ME. R. CIM. P. 24(a)).
Judge (MD. R. P. 543(d), 745).
Judge (MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234, § 28 (Cum. Supp.
1975). See also MAss. R. Civ. P. 47(a)).
Judge (MICH. COURT R. 511.3).
Judge plus attorney (MINN. R. Civ. P. 47.01; MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 26.02, subd. 4(1)).
Attorney (Miss. CODE. ANN. § 13-5-69 (1972)).
Judge (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.160 (1953); State v.
Crockett, 419 S.W.2d 22, 26 (1967); Smith v. Nickels,
390 S.W.2d 578, 582 (1965)).
Attorney (MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-1909(c)
(1969); MONT. R. Civ. P. 47(a)).
Attorney (Oden v. State, 166 Neb. 729, 90 N.W.2d
356 (1958)).
Judge (NEv. R. Civ. P. 47(a); NEV. REv. STAT. §
175.031 (1973)).
Judge (N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:22 (Supp.
1973)).
Judge (N.J. COURT R. 1:8-3(a); State v. Manley, 54
N.J. 259, 271-83, 255 A.2d 193, 200-06 (1969)).
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New Mexico Judge plus attorney (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-23-39(a)
(Supp. 1975)).
New York Attorney (N.Y. Civ. PAc. LAW §§ 4105, 4107 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. CalM. PRO. LAW § 270.15
(McKinney 1971)).
North Carolina Judge plus attorney (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-15(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1974)).
North Dakota Attorney (N.D.R. Civ. P. 47(a); N.D.R. CiM. P.
24(a)).
Ohio Judge plus attorney (Oio R. Civ. P. 47(A); Omo R.
CalM. P. 24(A)).
Oklahoma Judge plus attorney (OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 6).
Oregon Civil: attorney (ORE. REV. STAT. § 17.160 (1973);
Criminal: judge plus attorney (ORE. REV. STAT. §
136.210 (1973)).
Pennsylvania Judge plus attorney (PA. R. C~aM. P. 1106(f), 1107
subd. B.2).
Rhode Island Judge plus attorney (R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-10-14
(Supp. 1974)).
South Carolina Judge (S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-202 (1962)).
South Dakota Attorney (S.D. CODE § 15-6-47(a) (1967)).
Tennessee Judge (TENN. R. Civ. P. 47.01).
Texas Attorney (TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 35.17 (Cum.
Supp. 1975)).
Utah Judge (UTAH R. Cv. P. 47(a)).
Vermont Attorney (VT. R. Civ. P. 47(a); VT. R. CarM. P.
24(a)).
Virginia Judge plus attorney (VA. CODE ANN. § 8-208.28
(Cum. Supp. 1975)).
Washington Civil: judge plus attorney (WASH. SUPER. CT. (CIV.)
R. 47(a); Criminal: attorney (WASH. SUPER. CT.
(CiuM.) R. 6.4(b)).
West Virginia Attorney (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-6-12 (1966)).
Wisconsin Attorney (Wis. R. Crv. P. 805.08(1)); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 972.01 (1971)).
Wyoming Attorney (WYo. R. Civ. P. 47(a); Wyo. R. QuM. P.
25(a)).
Federal Judge (FED. R. Cxv. P. 47(a); FED. R. CIM. P.
24(a)).

